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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, beste collega’s, waarde studenten, dames en heren, 
dear friends and family, 
 
 
Just over a year ago, when I was considering the offer of the Chair of International 
Relations at Leiden University, I was attracted by the prospect of working at an institution 
whose long-standing motto is “Bastion of Freedom.” 
Today, I am humbled to give this inaugural lecture in the same hall where, seventy-
four years ago, Professor Cleveringa defied the Nazi occupation, urging his students to 
remain true to the Dutch tradition of equality and non-discrimination. 
That struggle against repression, against the denial and violation of the most 
fundamental human rights, remains with us today. But as scholars and teachers, we have a 
special opportunity to help sustain the values -- at home and abroad -- that Professor 
Cleveringa so bravely defended in this hall. 
In that spirit, I would like to talk today about what social scientists have learned 
about how and under what conditions it is possible to promote greater respect for human 
rights across state borders. This has been one of my principal research and teaching themes 
for many years, and it remains so here at Leiden. 
I will focus today on research related principally to two sets of rights -- physical 
integrity rights such as freedom from arbitrary arrest, torture, and extrajudicial killing, and 
civil and political rights such as freedom of assembly, speech, and religion. Scholarship of 
the sort that I will be discussing has examined the dynamics around economic, social and 
cultural rights, but to a far lesser extent, so I will mention it only in passing. 
Toward the end of my remarks, I will highlight a recent development that social 
scientists did not foresee and that threatens to rollback much of the post-1945 effort to 





As all of you know, there is nothing new about the use of power and even terror to 
elevate one group of people over another, sometimes culminating in violent abuses of 
human dignity and physical well-being. From ancient history to the latest newspaper 
headlines, there is no shortage of evidence of our capacity to mistreat our fellow human 
beings. 
We also know, of course, that the same historical record contains repeated 
interventions by philosophers, politicians and activists who sought to create moral and 
institutional defenses against these abuses. 
But for most of human history, whether or not individuals and communities were 
subject to such abuses depended almost entirely on the whims of their rulers and the 
prejudices of their neighbors. In this regard, the principle of sovereignty, defined since the 
17th century as a state’s freedom from foreign intervention, is a double-edged sword: 
though intended to shield us from distant threats to our freedoms, sovereignty also 
enshrines in law every person’s vulnerability to neglect and abuse by local authorities. 
The democratic revolutions and expanded franchise of the 18th and 19th centuries 
seemed to promise a national constitutional solution to this problem. But as Europeans 
learned in the 1930s and 1940s, national institutions can easily be converted from bulwarks 
of justice into mechanisms of terror. 
And we’re not talking only about authoritarian regimes.  Many types of governments 
around the world rely on practices that make a mockery of internationally recognized 
“human rights.” Even electoral democracies have engaged in systematic violations of human 
rights, sometimes for extended periods of time (Davenport 2007, 2013). Sometimes these 
abuses are sparked by specific threats to constitutional order or public safety, but other 
times they are simply a convenient way to sustain an illegitimate social order or to maintain 
a ruling clique’s hold on power. 
After the horrors of the Holocaust were revealed, and in response to the defense 
lawyers’ arguments at Nuremberg that governments are entitled to treat their citizens as 
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they wish, an effort was made to embed national institutions and practices within an 
international legal framework designed to protect human rights. 
The leaders of this effort, from John Humphreys to René Cassin to Eleanor Roosevelt, 
believed deeply in the power of international law. They were thus the pioneers of a 
conceptual paradigm that dominated both practice and scholarship in the human rights field 
for nearly half a century – the idea that the best insurance against human rights violations at 
the national level is institutional change at the international level. 
Despite what the cynics say, this confidence was not entirely absurd: as legal scholar 
Louis Henkin (1979) observed, most states obey most international law most of the time. 
But the international legal system differs from national legal systems in three 
important respects: 
(1) It is not reinforced by strong normative consensus among relevant actors 
(2) It is not supported by authoritative procedures for legal interpretation 
(3) It lacks any robust centralized capacity to identify, arrest and punish violators 
As a result, international law has far less “compliance pull” than national law. 
To make matters worse, human rights law lacks the built-in incentives that have 
proven remarkably effective at promoting compliance in other areas of decentralized 
international governance, such as trade and arms control. Governments have little reason to 
care whether another government is violating the rights of its citizens, so there is no 
reciprocity dynamic that might motivate them to comply with human rights rules when 
doing so could contradict deeply held values or jeopardize their hold on power. 
As such, if there is any reciprocity dynamic at work in this field, it is unfortunately 
one that reduces the incentive to respect human rights. Put simply, governments that know 
they may someday be charged with violating their own commitments to respect human 
rights have traditionally been reluctant to criticize others for the same violations. 
As a result, the broadening and deepening of international human rights law, from 
the Universal Declaration of 1948 to the International Covenants of 1967, did not bring 
about any significant change in the internal structures or practices of states. Hence the 
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popular charge by the 1970s that such documents are “not worth the paper they’re printed 
on.” 
It is therefore not surprising that political scientists in this period were not impressed 
by international lawyers’ detailed chronicling of the development of human rights law and 
the international institutions associated with it. There’s no need to study something that 
doesn’t have observable effects, was the general attitude in my discipline. 
 
The First Wave 
In retrospect, we can see that the problem was not that human rights law was 
always ineffective, but that political scientists at the time had no conceptual framework for 
understanding its effects. This was due in part to political scientists’ ignorance of 
international law – which was then quite widespread, but is now shrinking (Dunoff and 
Pollack 2013, Reus-Smit 2004, Simmons and Steinberg 2006). 
But it was due principally to the deep divide within my discipline in this period 
between those who focused on relations between states (the prevailing definition of 
‘international relations’) and those who focused on the internal structures and dynamics of 
states (the sub-field of ‘comparative politics’).  In other words, much of the politics of 
human rights was invisible to political scientists because our discipline was blind to cross-
border relationships between state and non-state actors (‘transnational relations’). 
But my discipline’s conceptual blinders did not prevent human rights activists and 
social movements around the world from recognizing that the spreading web of political 
and legal commitments to the protection of human rights could be a powerful tool in their 
struggles against political repression. Opponents of one-party Communist rule in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union starting in the mid 1970s, followed by opponents of military 
rule in Argentina and Chile in the 1980s, began to frame their mobilization, both at home 
and across borders, in terms of their states’ compliance with their commitments to respect 
human rights. 
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As I and other political scientists began to note in the early 1990s, these 
transnational campaigns were proving surprisingly effective at using international human 
rights norms to mobilize local actors, recruit foreign allies, entrap repressive state 
authorities in their legal commitments and thus move them toward political reform.  
This new research agenda was founded on two simple assumptions: First, states 
value acceptance within international society, and this acceptance depends in part upon 
rhetorical and behavioral commitment to human rights norms that had been agreed at the 
international level. Second, states are increasingly unable to hide their human rights records 
or to prevent social mobilization across national borders (Sikkink 1993, Keck and Sikkink 
1998, Thomas 1991a, 1991b, 1994). 
This did not mean that every signature of a human rights treaty would be followed 
by radical changes in state behavior: there were still powerful incentives for states to ignore 
or even to violate human rights. But the aforementioned compliance sensitivity created 
counter-incentives that could help pro-compliance constituencies to build unprecedented 
alliances at home and abroad and pressure their leaders for change. 
By the late 1990s, this new optimism about the political significance of international 
human rights law had coalesced into a ‘spiral model’ of human rights change -- a complex 
conjecture regarding the dynamics and consequences of transnational pressure on 
repressive states (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). This model has five stages: 
 In stage 1, state repression motivates local non-state actors to reach out to potential 
allies abroad in the hope that they would pressure the repressive state to fulfill its 
legal obligations on human rights. 
 In stage 2, repressive states deny the charges against them, claiming either that they 
are not subject to international norms or that they are already in full compliance 
with these norms. 
 In stage 3, mounting transnational pressure, including clear evidence of non-
compliance and a threat of social or material sanctions, leads the target states to 
make tactical concessions. These concessions could include stronger rhetorical 
commitment to international human rights norms, expanded space for grassroots 
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mobilization, and/or greater leniency toward high-profile dissidents or independent 
media. 
 In stage 4, international norms acquire prescriptive status. As states accept the 
norms’ validity, they become entrapped in a new rhetoric, setting in motion 
bureaucratic and political processes of adaptation. 
 In stage 5, states move toward norm-consistent behavior, incorporating respect for 
human rights into their institutional identity and standard operating procedures and 
thus ending systemic violations. 
While recognizing that repressive states might refuse to change their behavior, or might 
begin to reform and then clamp down, early proponents of the spiral model (myself 
included) were generally optimistic that as long as civil society was sufficiently tenacious, 
repressive states would find it hard to resist the reform dynamic. In short, political 
liberalization was a likely, if unintended and often even unanticipated, consequence of 
states’ quest for international legitimacy (de Zwart 2013). 
Early empirical research seemed to support this expectation: paired case studies from 
across Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America indicated that once transnational mobilization 
set the spiral dynamic in motion, most repressive states moved toward stages 4 and even 5. 
There were relatively few cases of sustained denial or backsliding after initial concessions. 
All seven of the cases that reached prescriptive status (stage 4) eventually experienced 
sustained improvements in human rights protection (stage 5) (Risse, Ropp, Sikkink 1999). 
My own study of transnational dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union found 
that local and transnational mobilization around the human rights norms of the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act had contributed significantly to the expansion of civil society and the 
weakening of one-party Communist rule across the region, and thus to the regime changes 
there fifteen years later (Thomas 1999, 2001, 2002, 2005). 





The Second Wave 
Before long, other scholars began to unpack the spiral model and examine its various 
claims in greater detail, often with large-N quantitative methods that had not been used 
widely in the first wave. Not surprisingly, the results revealed a complex reality – some but 
not all of it consistent with the first-generation scholarship. 
So what has this new research revealed? 
First, it tells us a lot about the conditions of state repression – why states violate the 
physical integrity and the civil and political rights of their citizens: 
The simplest and most empirically robust answer is that governments become 
repressive when they perceive a threat to their survival: perhaps not surprisingly, research 
shows that repression is highly likely when governments face violent protest, rebellion and 
other strong forms of dissent (Carey, Gibney, Poe 2010, Conrad and Moore 2010, Davenport 
2007, Franklin 1997). And democracy does not seem to help until it is well established: 
repression is rare in states with robust multi-party competition and strong accountability 
mechanisms, but common in weak and newly established democracies (De Mesquita et al 
2005, Simmons 2009). 
Economic variables matter as well. For example, repression is less likely in states with 
higher per capita GDP (Carey, Gibney, Poe 2010, Davenport 2007, Franklin 1997) and in 
states that rely on their citizenry for generating revenue, rather than on the extraction of 
high-value natural resources (DeMeritt and Young 2013). Despite extensive research on 
globalization, the evidence is mixed regarding its effects on repressiveness: higher trade 
flows do not seem to affect repressiveness, but high dependency on exports increases 
repression, and foreign direct investment has mixed effects (Hafner-Burton 2005). 
Another contribution of second-wave research is its recognition that violations of 
human rights are often due to the inability of weak and failed states to protect their citizens, 
rather than to the choices of strong states that find repression useful (Englehart 2009, Risse, 
Ropp, Sikkink 2013). This highlights the limitations of the first wave’s assumption that it is 
possible to prevent or reduce violations through social and material sanctions on non-
compliant states. 
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The issue of state choice links directly to the question of why so many states -- 
including quite repressive states -- sign and ratify international human rights treaties in the 
first place, including treaties with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms. As one scholar 
(Simmons 2009) asked, why do states give their domestic and foreign opponents the tools 
with which to flagellate them? 
There is some evidence that attributes this decision to a state’s exposure to 
particularly compelling arguments (Hawkins 2004), but the consensus view among those 
who study this issue is that states make strategic choices. Some governments will ratify a 
human rights treaty because they value its content and expect to comply (which makes 
commitment cost-free) while others value the treaty’s content but don’t ratify because of 
particular constitutional obstacles. This leaves the ‘strategic ratifiers’ -- the large number of 
states that ratify human rights treaties because the gains are clear and immediate (reducing 
peer pressure, avoiding criticism) while the costs are unclear or distant (Simmons 2009). 
Hence the concern that, in the absence of social mobilization, international human 
rights law enables repressive states to gain international legitimacy through symbolic 
commitments with very little costs – what sociologists call ‘decoupling’ between words and 
acts (Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui and Meyer 2008). This suggests that global expectations matter 
to states, but they remain sensitive to political costs. In fact, we know that states are 
sometimes willing to withdraw from human rights treaties when compliance becomes too 
costly (Helfer 2002). Taken together, this presents a real challenge to those who wish to 
promote respect for human rights by naming, shaming, and sanctioning those who fail to 
comply with their commitments. 
Nonetheless, second wave research has confirmed its predecessors’ general 
conjecture that international treaties on human rights create important opportunities for 
non-state actors to press for political change.  For example, a multi-method analysis of 
political change in Argentina and Guatemala found that transnational pressure to respect 
human rights led the military dictatorships there to make critical reforms despite persistent 
and powerful cross-cutting incentives that favored continued repression (Cardenas 2007). 
A major quantitative study of five major human rights treaties – civil and political 
rights, economic and social rights, torture, women’s rights, children’s rights – found that 
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treaty ratification resulted in significant improvements in states that are partially 
democratic with strong rule of law and judicial independence. Well-established democracies 
have better human rights records overall but -- the same study found -- their performance is 
not significantly affected by treaty ratification, presumably because they already offer 
adequate opportunities for local actors to mobilize for change (Simmons 2009). 
Second-wave research also reveals that naming and shaming is remarkably effective. 
A large-N study of Latin American governments’ responses to domestic mobilization 
between 1981 and 1995 found that criticism by foreign NGOs, religious groups and 
governments had a significant effect on reducing repression, and that this effect was 
reinforced by but not dependent on foreign direct investment (Franklin 2008). Similarly, 
shaming by the United Nations and by human rights NGOs has a strong negative correlation 
with the severity of politically-motivated mass murders (Krain 2012) and government killing 
of individual political opponents, though it appears to be more effective at preventing such 
atrocities than at stopping them (DeMeritt 2012). 
All told, this research supports the view of repression as a choice – as a tactic that 
governments select (or don’t select) in response to particular incentives. This should be 
encouraging to those who seek to promote respect for human rights by manipulating the 
incentives faced by governments around the world. 
That said, the second wave of human rights research has left much to be learned 
about the ‘compliance gap’ – the empirical discrepancy between states’ legal obligations to 
respect human rights and their actual behavior. In fact, our assessment of the gap is 
significantly affected by changes in how key information is gathered and reported (Clark and 
Sikkink 2013) and by differing approaches to how the resulting data should be analyzed (Dai 
2013). As a result, scholars disagree over the size of compliance gap and whether it’s 
growing or shrinking over time. 
Furthermore, research focused on the most repressive states in the international 
system shows that they do not become less repressive after ratifying human rights treaties, 
leading some to conclude that human rights law fails precisely where it’s most needed 
(Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). 
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In addition, the transnational effects of treaty ratification are far more conditional 
that we recognized in the 1990s. We now know that transnational mobilization for human 
rights compliance is most effective when targeted on new or partial democracies, on states 
with effective control over their own bureaucracies, on highly centralized states, and on 
states with high social and material vulnerability to sanctions. In contrast, stable autocracies 
and full democracies, weak and failed states, federal and decentralized states, and states 
with low social and material vulnerability all require different forms of human rights 
promotion (Risse, Ropp, Sikkink 2013). 
NGOs, foreign ministries and international organizations committed to promoting 
respect for human rights would be wise to incorporate these research findings into their 
strategies. Failure to do so would mean wasting precious resources, at best, and at worst, 
selecting tactics that make things worse rather than better. For example, sanctions tend to 
undermine human rights conditions in weak states, but certain forms of capacity building 
are likely to help. 
But making such tactical adjustments will not suffice. 
 
Toward a Third Wave? 
This brings me to the point I made at the outset -- the transnational politics of 
human rights have changed in recent years in ways that were unforeseen by most scholars 
in this field. 
As I said earlier, scholarship on why repressive states ratify human rights treaties 
generally views this is a strategic choice. On the other hand, scholarship on transnational 
pressure for human rights compliance, both first and second wave, tends to view the states 
that are subject to this pressure as passive structures, incapable of responding strategically 
to such a direct threat to their political survival. As such, the literature incorrectly assumes, 
at least implicitly, that transnational dynamics are automatically conducive to the protection 
of human rights. The question is just by how much. 
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This is an important mistake. Leaders of authoritarian regimes do not gain power or 
in stay in power by being passive. They are fully capable of strategic action, including 
deliberate steps to confront their opponents and restructure the political environment in 
which they operate (Svolik 2012). 
If we want to understand the dynamics and the conditions of human rights 
promotion, we must therefore learn more about how repressive states are shielding 
themselves from pressure by restructuring transnational dynamics in their favor. In other 
words, how they are turning the transnational dynamic on its head. This should be the third 
wave of human rights research in political science. 
As a first step in this direction, I will now take a few minutes to discuss four ways that 
certain states are using transnational dynamics to shelter themselves from pressure to 
respect human rights: 
First, some states are seeking to reverse the de-legitimation of repressive states that 
has occurred through the creation and spread of international human rights norms. This 
defensive legitimation takes various forms. By embracing human rights norms on paper 
while ignoring them in practice, states seek to gain the legitimacy that goes to treaty 
members without paying significant compliance costs. Sometimes this involves selective 
compliance: one study found that states targeted by transnational naming and shaming 
tend to reduce highly visible violations while increasing less visible forms of intimidation and 
abuse (Hafner-Burton 2008). This may explain why autocratic regimes that have ratified 
human rights treaties remain in power longer than non-ratifiers (Hollyer and Rosendorff 
2012). 
Another form of defensive legitimation is counter-shaming: regimes that are the 
subject of naming and shaming by foreign governments and international organisations 
frequently respond by highlighting (or exaggerating) human rights violations elsewhere. This 
was a common Soviet practice during the Cold War. In recent months, not long after a UN 
Commission of Inquiry issued a scathing report on systematic and mass abuses of human 
rights in North Korea, the government in Pyongyang released its own report on racism, 
poverty and social exclusion in the United States (Nebehay and Miles 2014, Korean Central 
News Agency 2014). Apart from a number of serious distortions and outright errors, the 
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North Korean report contained enough accurate material to be taken seriously in the world 
media, thereby diffusing pressure on China to rein in its Korean ally (Zurcher 2014). 
A final form of defensive legitimation is when repressive governments embrace the 
global trend toward the establishment of “national human rights institutions” while quietly 
ensuring that their own NHRIs have weak mandates, insufficient autonomy, and inadequate 
funding, and increasing repression to ensure that their citizens don’t get the ‘wrong’ idea. 
This is another example of the ‘decoupling’ of global scripts and local practice (Cole and 
Ramirez 2013, Koo and Ramirez 2009). 
The second way that states are using transnational dynamics to shelter themselves 
from human rights pressure is through a form of normative entrepreneurship. Many of the 
same states that seek international legitimacy by wrapping themselves in the rhetoric of 
human rights are simultaneously working behind the scenes to weaken the newest 
normative innovations associated with human rights while promoting alternative norms. For 
example, since the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court entered into 
force in 2002, and the UN General Assembly approved the ‘responsibility to protect’ in 2005, 
a handful of states have worked in the UN to resist the consolidation of a norm of 
international responsibility for human rights. 
But these states are not just playing defense: since the Asian values debate of the 
1990s and especially since the financial crisis of 2008 led to economic stagnation in the 
world’s liberal democracies, autocratic states around the world have openly advocated a 
model of socio-economic development that prioritizes common goods over individual rights. 
Their goal, of course, is to challenge the hegemonic position of government focused on 
respect for individual rights and thus to reduce domestic and foreign pressure for 
compliance with international human rights treaties. 
The third way that states are seeking to exploit transnational dynamics is through 
institutional capture  -- the campaign by repressive states to shelter themselves from 
compliance pressure by taking over international institutions responsible for human rights 
monitoring. Some would say that we shouldn’t exaggerate the novelty or importance of this 
tactic: after all, membership of the UN Commission on Human Rights was hardly limited to 
rights-respecting states between its establishment in 1946 and its closure in 2006, and 
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research shows that the actions of the Commission were significantly less politicized after 
the end of the Cold War (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). 
However, the replacement of the Commission by the Human Rights Council in 2006 
was supposed to ensure that the UN’s lead human rights body would be composed of 
rights-respecting states and universal and objective in its activity. Instead, there does not 
appear to be any change in membership patterns, while the Council’s activity appears 
increasingly politicized. Many of the world’s most repressive regimes are regularly elected 
to the Council, where they and their allies overlook systematic abuses while twisting the 
language of human rights to justify practices that no neutral observer could square with the 
principles that the Council is meant to uphold. 
Finally, states are seeking to shelter themselves from pressure to respect human 
rights by changing their domestic legislation in ways that delegitimate and obstruct 
transnational mobilization. This tactic, which I call legislative insulation, involves laws that 
limit use of social media, impose burdensome requirements on the registration of local 
NGOs, prohibitions on foreign financing of local NGOs, and criminal penalties for ill-defined 
acts of treason and subversion. Versions of this tactic are most evident in Russia and China, 
but Egypt, Turkey and others have adopted it as well. Once this legislation is in place, state 
authorities can crack down on dissent and block cross-border networking while telling the 
world that they are upholding the rule of law! 
Taken together, these four tactics – defensive legitimation, normative 
entrepreneurship, institutional capture and legislative insulation – constitute a reverse 
version of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) famous boomerang effect. Unlike the dynamics that 
originally inspired this term, the reverse boomerang effect is not driven by human rights 
activists using transnational space to change the behavior of states that rule (and repress) 
them. Instead, the reverse boomerang effect is driven by repressive states using 
transnational dynamics to shield themselves from pressure to comply with human rights 
norms. 
If this dynamic gains traction, it could significantly undermine whatever modest 
progress has been made by the human rights movement over the last 65 years. This is why 
political scientists working on human rights, like myself, need to make this an important part 
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of our research agenda. We need to understand this reverse boomerang effect in more 
detail, and especially how it interacts with the two pillars of the human rights movement 
since 1945 -- international legal codification and transnational mobilization. There is much 
to be learned in this area. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Having said all that, an oratie would not be complete without acknowledging those 
whose support was essential to my being here today. 
In the first place, I would like to thank het College van Bestuur of Leiden University 
for appointing me to the chair in international relations. My thanks also go to the members 
of the Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, and to the Board of the 
Institute of Political Science, who contributed to my appointment. In particular, I would like 
to acknowledge our faculty dean, Professor Hanna Swaab, and my institute’s director, 
Professor Petr Kopecky. It is truly an honor to be part of this university. 
Of course, without the devoted teachers that I have had over the years, I would 
never have been in a position to apply for this post. This could be a long list, but I would 
especially like to acknowledge Professors Robert Art and Gordon Fellman from Brandeis 
University, as well as Professors Peter Katzenstein and Sidney Tarrow from Cornell 
University. Many years after leaving their classrooms and offices, I am still inspired by them. 
But just as my career has been shaped by my former professors, it has also been 
shaped by my students. From Chicago to Pittsburgh to Dublin, and now Leiden, I have had 
the privilege of working with students whose interest in international relations and 
especially the politics of human rights is a constant source of inspiration. 
My deepest gratitude goes to the members of my family who are here today: my 
parents, Susan and Didier, my wife and son, Susanne and Julien. Thank you so much for all 
the years of loving support and encouragement. 
Finally, ladies and gentlemen, thank you all for your kind attention and your interest. 
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